This paper focuses on the observed empirical relationship between fiscal rules and budget deficits, and examines whether this correlation is driven by an omitted variable, namely voter preferences. We make use of two different estimation methods to capture voter preferences in a panel of Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions. First, we include a recently constructed measure of fiscal preferences. Second, we capture preferences through fixed effects with a structural break as women are enfranchised. We find that fiscal rules continue to have a significant impact on real budget balances.
Introduction
The emergence of persistent budget deficits and rising public debt levels in industrialised countries has triggered a large amount of research into causes and possible solutions. Theoretical models increasingly incorporate the view that politicians act as optimizing agents instead of improbable benevolent social planners, in turn illustrating how the political process can lead to suboptimal economic outcomes with a bias toward deficits 1 . In response to the emergence of a deficit bias, some have argued in favour of formal restraints on fiscal policy. Skeptics, however, argue that fiscal rules can always be circumvented when policy makers wish to run deficits, and hence, that fiscal rules do not work as an effective restraint on fiscal policy.
The empirical evidence that fiscal rules result in lower budget deficits tentatively suggests that rules do work. For instance, several studies conducted at the sub-federal (cantonal) level in Switzerland find effects of formal restraints which are both statistically significant and economically quite relevant 2 . But there is concern that the estimated impact of fiscal rules does not constitute a causal link from rules to budgets, but is instead driven at least partially by unobserved heterogeneity in the cross section. A candidate for such unobserved heterogeneity is voter preferences. Poterba (1996) argues that "The critical question for policy evaluation is how to interpret these correlations between budget institutions and fiscal policy outcomes. It is possible that the correlations simply reflect correlations involving fiscal discipline, fiscal institutions, and an omitted variable, voter tastes for fiscal restraint."
3
Suppose that more fiscally conservative voters prefer lower budget deficits and prefer their constitutions to reflect this by containing balanced budget rules or debt "breaks", even though these rules are not ex post enforceable. Suppose also that politicians on average care about reelection and have a greater probability of reelection if they cater to voters' preferences (a median voter type of argument). Then jurisdictions with more fiscally conservative electorates would tend to see lower budget deficits as well as a higher likelihood of having a fiscal rule, without necessarily having any direct effect of the latter on the former.
This paper tests whether the often estimated impact of fiscal rules on budgetary outcomes is mainly driven by voter preferences. We make use of two complementary approaches. First, we include a new measure of fiscal preferences by Funk and Gathmann (2006) in an otherwise standard panel specification for budget deficits. In so doing, we are able to test whether the significance of the statistical relationship between fiscal rules and budget deficits remains once we control for voter preferences. This has not previously been possible because such measures did not exist or were not reliable. In a second approach, we follow Dafflon and Pujol (2001) and assume that an individual voter's fiscal preferences are largely time-invariant. If this is the case, then the only change in an electorate's fiscal preferences will happen when the composition of the electorate changes. Over the last 50 years, the most important change in the composition of Swiss cantonal electorates occurred when women were granted the right to vote, which happened relatively late (the first cantons to grant women the right to vote were Neuchâtel and Vaud in 1959, and the last was Appenzell I. Rh. in 1990), and at different times across cantons. Krogstrup and Wälti (2007) provide evidence that adding women to the electorate changed the preferences of the median voter with regard to fiscal discipline in Swiss cantons. We therefore propose to capture the electorate's preferences for fiscal discipline by cross section fixed effects, and by allowing for a structural break arising from women's enfranchisement. Including simple fixed effects in budget balance regressions with fiscal rules is not usually done in regressions including fiscal rules because the low time variation in fiscal rules indices implies that the standard fixed effects estimator is likely to produce inefficient estimates. As a remedy, we make use of the newly proposed vector decomposition approach by Plümper and Troeger (2007) to disentangle observed and unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity. In this way, we are able to include fixed effects as well as to generate more efficient estimates.
We focus on Switzerland as a case study and find that the two estimation approaches result in the same outcome: fiscal rules continue to have a significant, positive effect on budgetary outcomes after controlling for voter preferences. The estimated impact of fiscal rules decreases only by a small amount when voter preferences are taken into account.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on fiscal rules and budgetary outcomes. Section 3 presents our two econometric approaches to controlling for voter preferences, while Section 4 presents the data. Results for OLS regressions and vector decompositions are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 respectively.
The final section concludes.
A number of empirical studies address the question of whether or not fiscal rules have empirical effects on the budget balance and the level of public debt. Much of the work in this area focuses on federal states, most notably the United States, Canada and Switzerland.
The sub-federal jurisdictions of these countries have some degree of fiscal independence and cross-jurisdictional variation in their fiscal institutions, while being less heterogeneous in other political, institutional or cultural dimensions than central government fiscal authorities might be. As such, these federal states provide laboratory-like conditions for testing the impact of fiscal rules on budgetary outcomes.
The results of these studies largely support the hypothesis that fiscal rules result in lower budget deficits. Several studies carried out in the mid-nineties for the United States find that the presence and/or strength of fiscal rules are associated with faster policy initiatives to reduce unexpected deficits (Poterba, 1994; Alt and Lowry, 1994) or lower budget deficits overall (Bohn and Inman, 1996; Alesina and Bayoumi, 1996) . Similar evidence for Canadian provinces indicates that provincial legislation against deficits leads to stronger budget balances, other things equal (Tellier and Imbeau, 2004 prudence. The relative share of seats therefore comprises much more information than just the fiscal preferences of voters and as such, it is at best a noisy indicator of fiscal preferences.
In the words of Dafflon and Pujol (2001) , "the pertinent measure of conservatism for our issue ought to be directly related to the notion of fiscal conservatism which is different from the general notion of political conservatism" 4 .
To better control for voter preferences in regressions of fiscal outcomes on fiscal institutions, Dafflon and Pujol (2001) and Funk and Gathmann (2006) This produces a relative measure of fiscal conservatism. As fiscal federal referenda are the same across all cantons, and concern federal fiscal issues rather than cantonal fiscal issues, the voter behavior can be directly compared across cantons, as it is less likely to be linked to the particular fiscal situation in the canton in question. Dafflon into an otherwise standard specification for public spending to examine a potential omitted variable bias in regressions focusing on the relationship between fiscal mandatory referenda and public expenditures in Swiss cantons. When fiscal preferences are taken into account, the effect of mandatory referenda is much smaller than initially thought, and completely disappears when municipal spending levels are also taken into account. These findings imply that controlling for voter preferences remains essential for policy evaluation. We turn to this below.
Suppose that the true model of budget balances is given by
This model abstracts from an intercept term and from other control variables for the clarity of the exposition. The dependent variable, denoted as b it , measures the budget balance of canton i at time t, f r it is an index capturing the presence or strength of fiscal rules, and vp it stands for the degree of fiscal conservatism of the electorate. Estimating this model by ordinary least squares while omitting voter preferences yieldŝ
The estimate of the coefficient α obtained by ordinary least squares, denoted asα OLS , is biased and inconsistent when the covariance between fiscal rules and voter preferences is different from zero. In other words, the coefficient estimate will be biased and inconsistent when both the budget balance and the presence/strength of fiscal rules are simultaneously determined by a third factor. In particular, the coefficient estimate will be biased upwards in so far as it captures part of the effect of voter preferences on the budget balance.
We explore two avenues to address this omitted variable problem. First, we make use of the measure of cantonal fiscal preferences constructed by Funk and Gathmann (2006) to control for voter preferences in an otherwise standard regression equation for budget balances. Our aim is to examine whether the statistical significance of the coefficient estimate for fiscal rules survives the introduction of a direct measure of voter preferences.
In such a way, we are able to preclude that the estimated relationship is driven only by voter preferences.
There is a caveat here. Funk and Gathmann (2006) interpret their measure of voters' fiscal preferences as capturing preferences for redistribution and, hence, preferences for overall spending and the size of the state. Since there is no direct or obvious link between preferences for more public spending and preferences for larger budget deficits if the intertemporal budget constraint is understood and respected, we have to assume that this measure also captures preferences for intertemporal redistribution (we could also resort to fiscal illusion theories a la Buchanan, 1964 , to make a link from size of the state to deficits).
But it is not possible to know whether preferences for fiscal discipline are actually captured by this measure. We nevertheless use it since it is the best that we have for sub-federal entities in Switzerland, and keep this caveat in mind for the interpretation of our result.
Because of the lack of a clear interpretation for this measure of fiscal preferences, we propose a second and alternative way of controlling for voter preferences in budget deficit regressions relying instead on econometric technique. As in Dafflon and Pujol (2001) , assume that voter preferences for budget deficits are largely time-invariant. In this case, equation (1) can be rewritten as
Exploiting the panel structure of the dataset allows to capture cantonal fiscal prefer-ences through the introduction of cross-section fixed effects. This is indeed the standard motivation for using panel data in that it solves the problem of time-invariant omitted variables. But many authors, e.g. Feld and Kirchgässner (2006) , have resisted using fixedeffects estimation on the ground of efficiency. Fiscal rules display relatively little time variation and the introduction of fixed effects implies that we do not take the between variation of the data into account. Consequently, the standard error of the coefficient estimates will be very large, thereby making statistical inference difficult.
We remedy the problem of inefficiency of the fixed-effects estimation by applying the 
In this case, the estimation of the coefficients α and ϕ is problematic because the fiscal 
Second, we decompose the estimated fixed effectυ i into time-invariant observed heterogeneity, captured by c i and f r i , and time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, denoted by ξ i . The former part captures the effect of time-invariant and almost time-invariant variables, whereas the latter part will capture time-invariant cantonal fiscal preferences and other unobserved heterogeneity:υ
Finally, we reestimate the full model including the estimated unobserved heterogeneity, which is by definition orthogonal to the almost time-invariant variable capturing fiscal rules:
The decomposition allows for solving the problem of inefficiency of the coefficient estimates. Plümper and Troeger (2007) show that this decomposition is a superior approach (in terms of the root mean squared errors) to the traditional fixed-effects estimation when the time-invariant or almost time-invariant variables exhibit a ratio of the between variance to the within variance that is large enough. Finally, our assumption of time-invariant preferences could be questioned since our sample period contains a major structural break in the composition in the electorate. while all other cantons exhibited average deficits.
There are five cantons that have fiscal rules during our sample period: St Gallen, Fribourg, Solothurn, Appenzell A. Rh. and Graubünden 6 . These rules are written either in the cantonal constitution or in the cantonal budget law. Beyond differences in their characteristics and implementation, they have in common that they constrain fiscal policy by limiting the size of deficits and requiring a balanced budget either in the current fiscal year or over the medium term.
The previous theoretical and empirical literature on budget deficits suggests a list of control variables which are relevant for explaining deficits. Tax-smoothing arguments (Barro, 1979) and Keynesian countercyclical fiscal policy prescriptions imply that budget deficits should co-vary negatively with economic conditions. We therefore control for the rate of growth of real gross cantonal income (federal and international economic conditions will be captured through time fixed effects). Fiscal redistribution across cantons is taken into account by including the growth rate of the real unconditional federal grants per capita that each canton receives. The cantonal demographic structure could put pressure on cantonal public finances and it is captured by including the share of the population above sixty-five years old. We control for changes in the ideological orientation of cantonal parliaments (Hibbs, 1977; Persson and Svensson, 1989) by including the share of seats held by left-wing political parties. Finally, we also make use of dummy variables to take account of time-invariant cantonal characteristics such as language (which takes a value of unity for French and Italian-speaking cantons), the presence of a large city, and the presence of a university.
Observed fiscal preferences: OLS regressions
Our first approach to control for voter preferences is to include the measure of cantonal fiscal preferences computed by Funk and Gathmann (2006) into an otherwise standard regression equation for budget balances. So doing, we are able to test whether the estimate of the coefficient attached to the dummy variable capturing fiscal rules remains statistically significant. Table 1 presents the results. The coefficient estimate for the variable capturing fiscal preferences is significant only at the 10% level.
Overall, including the Funk-Gathmann measure of fiscal preferences in regressions of fiscal rules on budgetary outcomes, we find no evidence that voter preferences are driving the estimated qualitative impact of fiscal rules. Voters' fiscal preferences do not have a robust direct effect on budgetary outcomes. However, given the caveat that these are preferences for redistribution, it is necessary to complement these results with our second 7 An interesting little aside here is that if the measure of fiscal preferences relate solely to intra-temporal redistribution issues and the size of the state, the result suggests partial fiscal illusion of voters, who prefer more government without fully internalizing the associated necessary tax increases to comply with the intertemporal budget constraint.
8 Beyond statistical significance, our results also cast light on the economic significance of fiscal rules. The introduction of fiscal rules decreases the average budget deficit per capita by about 83 Swiss francs (measured in 1993 prices) in a given year. This amount is relatively large compared to the average budget deficit per capita of Swiss cantons which is equal to 121 Swiss francs (measured in 1993 prices).
approach.
Unobserved fiscal preferences: fixed-effects vector decompositions
Our second approach relies on the assumption that voter preferences are constant over time, so that they can be captured through cross-section fixed effects. A dummy variable accounts for the structural break in preferences induced by the enfranchisement of women during our sample period. Table 2 Standard fixed-effects regressions are highly inefficient when including cross-section fixed effects along with a fiscal rule dummy variable which exhibits little time variation.
As expected, the values of coefficient estimates and the associated t statistics decrease by a significant amount. It is therefore necessary to employ alternative techniques which are relatively more efficient when the empirical specification includes both cross-section fixed effects and variables that are almost time-invariant. Our results make this point very clear.
Concluding remarks
Fiscal indiscipline has been on the rise in industrial countries since the late 1970s, leading to increasing average levels of deficits and public debt levels. One of the means by which policy makers have attempted to "tie their own hands"to more fiscal prudent policies has been the adoption of so called fiscal rules requiring that budgets remain above a certain threshold in either actual or cyclically adjusted terms. The question is whether such rules work, and this question has triggered a large and growing research agenda. The empirical literature finds relatively unambiguously that fiscal rules are associated with improved budget balances. But it has not been possible to convincingly establish whether this relationship represents a causal link from rules to outcomes. The main concern is that the relationship is driven by a third variable, namely voters' preferences for fiscal policies.
In this paper, we propose two solutions to these issues and investigate whether voter Second, we seek to capture fiscal preferences through the introduction of cross-section fixed effects with a structural break as the electorate is infused with women voters, and by using a newly proposed efficient estimator to account for the low within variation of the variable capturing fiscal rules.
We revisit the existing evidence based on Swiss cantonal data with these two approaches in hand. Our results are consistent across the two methods. When taking into account fiscal preferences of the electorate, the estimated impact of fiscal rules on real budget balances decreases slightly but remains highly significant. Our results therefore lend further support to the conclusions of the existing literature, and imply that fiscal rules might just work for the purposes of keeping average budget balances in check over the medium to long term, at least in Swiss cantons.
What our results do not tell us is whether fiscal rules work better than other means of "tying one's hands"when it comes to a more elaborate set of goals of fiscal policy. It is important in this respect to keep in mind that while fiscal rules might enhance fiscal discipline, they have been argued to potentially obstruct the conduct of countercyclical fiscal policy and to reduce beneficial productive public investments (see for example Krogstrup and Wyplosz, 2007). 
